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In The S11preme Court

of the State of Utah
NORTH DAVIS BANK, a Utah banking
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

C. RICHARD BARBER and
DAN R. FOGLE,

Case No.
12229

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Respondent North
Davis Bank, hereinafter referred to as "Bank",
against two Defendants, C. Richard Barber and Dan
R. Fogle. The Complaint is set out in three causes
of action, only the third of which (R.2) effects the
Appellant here, hereinafter referred to as "Fogle".
The action, as it effects this Appellant, is based upon
the agreement of Fogle to purchase sand and aggregate from Defendant Richard Barber and to pay
therefor to the Bank, to apply to the obligation of
Barber to the Bank (Ex. B at R.8), the sum of Five
Thousand Four Hundred Fifteen Dollars ($5,415.00)
together with interest. A copy of the said agree-
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ment is attached to Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 3, 4) and
also is included in the record as Plaintiff's Exhibit
"A" (R. 8). Defendant Dan R. Fogle died during the
pendency of this action and before trial, and by stipulation of the parties, his surviving widow, Alta M.
Fogle, was substituted as Defendant for the said Dan
R. Fogle for the purposes of trial.
Defendant C. Richard Barber apparently was
not served and did not file any responsive pleadings. Counsel is informed and believes that he has
been adjudicated a bankrupt.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for Davis County, The Honorable
Thornley Swan presiding, made its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (R. 9-12), finding that Fogle
was indebted to the Bank as prayed in Plaintiffs
Complaint, and concluding that Plaintiff Bank was
entitled to judgment thereon and pursuant thereto,
entered its judgment (R. 13, 14) granting judgment
against Appellant Alta M. Fogle as substitute Defendant for Dan R. Fogle in the amount, including
interest and attorney's fees of Five Thousand Seven
Hundred Four and 241100 Dollars ($5,704.24)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This appeal is taken by this Defendant Alta M.
Fogle as substitute Defendant for Dan R. Fogle, and
seeks a determination by this Court that competent
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evidence was improperly excluded and that there
is not competent evidence to support the Findings
of Fact of the trial court supporting its Conclusions
and Judgment, and that accordingly, the judgment
as to this Defendant and Appellant should be reversed and the action directed remanded or dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 11th day of July, 1966 Dan R.
Fogle entered into an agreement by the terms of
which he argreed to purchase from Richard Barber,
certain sand and/ or aggregate stockpiled in Davis
County, Utah and to pay to Respondent Bank therefor the sum of $5,415.00 together with interest at
the rate of seven per cent (7%) per annum (R. 3-4,
also Plaintiff's Exhibit "A"). Said agreement provided for the terms of payment and provided further,
inter alia, (R. 4, Exhibit "A', page 2)
"It is understood that the borrower
(Fogle) is not personally liable for the payment of the $5,415,00, but that the bank is
relying upon the sale of the sand and/or aggregate as the means of repaying the loan.
"In the event that borrower does use or
remove the sand then he becomes personally
liable for the value of the sand used or removed
from the stockpile at the rate of Fifty and
one-half cents ($0.505) per ton."

Also entered in evidence on the stipulation of
the parties was a Bill of Sale, Plaintiff's Exhibit "B'',
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whereby C. Richard Barber conveys an undisclosed
amount of sand 'previously processed by Seller and
presently stockpiled on the Valance C. Glover
property'' and provides for a purchase price to be
paid, the first twelve cents ($0.12) per ton to Valance
C. Glover who, as the owner of the property
claimed a lien upon the sand in place (this is intended as a clarification of the terms of the Bill of
Sale as this is not a material issue to the present
case), the next fifty and one-half cents ($0.505) per
ton to be paid to the Bank until said Bank has received the sum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00)
plus Four Hundred Fifteen Dollars ($415.00) interest,
and Seller Barber to be paid ten cents ($0.10) per
ton.
Before commencing the trial, Mr. John A. Rokich, counsel of record for the Bank, withdrew as
counsel for the Bank in order to appear as a witness and present counsel, Mr. James P. Cowley,
entered his appearance (R. 2, lines 9-15).
Mr. Dan R. Fogle, son of deceased Dan R. Fogle
and of the substitute Appellant Alta M. Fogle, was
called as a witness and testified that he had been
on the premises but could not recall the exact date
(T. 5, lines 1-13) that he observed two large stockpiles of sand but did not measure them by cross
section (T. 5, line 28 to 2. 6, line 4). Mr. Fogle testified that various sands and under various conditions vary significantly in weight per cubic yard,
from 2200 lbs per cu.yd to in excess of 3000 lbs per
cu.yd (R. 7, lines 9-17). The witness Allan R. Horsley
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was then called, who testified that he was in the
ready-mix concrete business and self-employed (T.
8, lines 11-14), that he had been to the site of the
sand in question in June or July of 1966 and observed stockpiled material there but did not measure it (T. 9, line 21 to T. 10, line 1). The witness further stated on cross examination that there were, in
fact, two piles of sand, that one was "unwashed
sand" and one was "washed sand', the larger of the
two being the unwashed (T. 10, lines 7-24).
The next witness, Mr. Fred R. Jensen, testified
that he was an employee of Dan R. Fogle Red-EMix, that he had been so employed about eight
years, that he had visited the property upon which
the sand was stockpiled (T. 11, lines 11-20), that during the course of his employment, he had worked
in the sand and gravel operation, that he had
measured subject sand and aggregate but had not
made a record of the measurements he took (T. 11,
line 24 to T. 12, line 9). He did testify that there was
a pile of approximately 90 ft by 70 or 60 ft which
was washed sand, and a pile of unwashed sand
which - because it was on a bank - was hard to
measure (T. 12, lines 10-20). He testified that at this
time there had been very little material removed by
Fogle (T. 12, line 27 to T. 13, line 1).
Counsel for the Bank then called Mr. Edwin L.
Stromberg who stated he was an officer of Plaintiff
Bank and that he had visited the Glover Sand &
Gravel Pit with Mr. Fogle in the latter part of May
1966 (T. 13, line 15 to T. 14, line 2). Mr. Stromberg
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testified that on his visit he saw two stockpiles, one
of unwashed sand and one washed sand, some
coarse aggregate and another pile of heavier aggregate (T. 15, lines 12-16). In response to the questioning of counsel for Bank and, over the objection of
counsel for Fogle (T. 15, lines 17-22), witness testified
that he had "estimated' (T. 15, lines 19 and 30) that
the unwashed sand was approximately 200 ft by 175
ft and "just estimating" maybe 20 ft high. That it
went "up on a slope, it went from maybe 4 to 20-25
ft" (T. 15, line 30 to T. 16, line 3). He testified that he
"estimated" (T. 16, line 6) that the washed sand was
approximately 75 ft by 150 ft and "oh, 20-25 ft high".
When asked a second time the height (T. 16, lines
9-10), he changed the figures of 20-25 ft to 25-30 ft.
He testified he had not used any type of measuring
device but only stepping it off, and figuring three
feet to the step (T. 16, lines 17-23).
Mr. John A. Rokich was next called. He testified
that he was an Attorney at Law and had been in
1966 an officer, director and stockholder of the Bank
(T. 17, line 22 to T. 18, line 5). Mr. Rokich testified
he had visited the site upon which the materials in
question were stockpiled, with a friend, Mr. Coon,
who had a construction business and they looked at
the sand and aggregate that was there stockpiled
(T. 21, lines 4-9). He stated that
" ..... part of it was sand that had been
washed but had become contaminated and the
best description I could give you of the other
was kind of an aggregate, looked to me like a

1
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pea gravel with a little dirt in it. Then there
was a pile, if I recall, I'd say maybe two to
four inches in diameter, a small pile of rock;
then there was also some larger rock there."
(T. 21, lines 11-17)

Mr. Rokich then testified that they made certain
measurements by stepping off these piles and described them as follows (T. 21. line 23 to T. 22, line
4).

"Well, one pile, the one pile-and I say, this
is, I would say probably a rough estimate, a
conservative estimate of what was there-one
would have been approximately, oh, about
125 x 75, maybe 15 ft. hig'h. The other pile
was, in my opinion, considerably larger, and
that was the w1washed. And that kind of went
on a slope, or pushed up, and it was irregular.
And that would have been about 150 x 125, and
maybe went as high as 30 ft and probably the
lowest point might have been as low as 5 or 6
ft. But, I say, that was somewhat irregular.
And that small rock, I don't think - would
maybe have been maybe 15, maybe 20 ft in
diameter. I don't recall on that."

Mr. Rokich further testified (T. 26, line 18 to T.
27, line 17) that they had not used a measuring device, but had stepped off the sand and estimated
the height from looking at it, that the pile varied in
depth, was "more of a rounded type of mound",
and that he had no knowledge as to the quality of
the sand.
Mr. Rokich next testified as to a conversation
which he had with the senior Dan R. Fogle (de-
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ceased at time of trial), over the objection of counsel
for Appellant (T. 23, line 27 to T. 24, line 16). He said
he went to Mr. Dan Fogle's place of business and
picked up a check (T. 24, line 17) at which time Mr.
Fogle stated to Mr. Rokich that he would sign some
promissory notes for the balance due on the sand
contract. He testified that Mr. Jensen advised Mr.
Fogle against signing notes (T. 24, lines 25-27), and
thereafter Mr. Fogle became ill (T. 24, line 28-29) and
the notes were never signed.
Appellant then recalled Mr. Jensen as the first
defense witness, who testified he had maintained a
record of the sand removed from subject premises
(T. 28, lines 12-23). Mr. Jensen was then asked (T. 28,
lines 24-26)
"Q. And can you tell us what your records
show as the amounts of sand removed
from the pit that was in the Barber stockpile?"

The question was objected to by counsel for the
Bank, the Court sustaining the objection (T. 29, lines
2-3). Mr. Jensen then identified Defendants proposed Exhibit 1 as being a record of the number of
tons that were hauled out of the stockpile at the
Barber pit (T. 29, lines 24-26). This document was offered in evidence and, on the objection of counsel
for the Bank, the offer of Defendant's Exhibit 1 was
denied (T. 30, line 18). Mr. Jensen then testified that
Mr. Horsley had bought most of the stockpiled sand
(T. 30, line 27), but on objection by counsel for Plain-
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tiff, the Court refused to allow Mr. Jensen to testify
a.s to the amount of sand sold to Mr. Horsley (T. 31,
line 13). Mr. Jensen testified that he had paid Mr.
Rakich some Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) "that
paid up the sand that we had used" (T. 31, lines 2324).
Mr. Horsley was then questioned by Counsel
for Fogle concerning standards of quality in the
concrete business with reference to the terms
"sand" or "aggregate" (T. 36, line 30 to T. 37, line 28).
This line of questioning was objected to by Counsel
for Plaintiff, and the objections sustained by the
Court. Mr. Dan R. Fogle was then recalled to the
witness stand and was also questioned by Counsel
for Defendant concerning standards of quality of
sand or aggregate, this line of questioning again
being objected to by Counsel for Plaintiff, and such
objections being sustained by the Court (T. 39, line
8 to T. 42, line 4). At this point, Defendant rested.
Mr. Rakich was recalled as a rebuttal witness,
after testifying to the application of certain monies
paid him by Fogle, the matter was submitted by respective counsel.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE
AMOUNT OF SAND AND AGGREGATE REMOVED BY
APPELLANT.

Mr. Jensen testified that he as an employee of
Appellant, as a part of his duties, maintained a
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record of the sand removed under subject a.greement (T. 28, lines 20-22), but when asked what these
records showed, the Court ruled that the records
themselves were the best evidence (T. 29, lines 2-3).
Mr. Jensen then identified the document marked
Defendants Exhibit 1 as being prepared by him from
the company records and that the same was a record of the number of tons hauled out of subject
premises (T. 29, lines 10-26). The Exhibit was then
offered in evidence, and the Court sustained Respondent's objection, that the document was not
the best evidence. As stated in Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed Para. 1230,
"Where a fact could be ascertained only by the
inspection of a large number of documents made
up of very numerous detailed statements-as,
the net balance resulting from a year's vouchers of a treasurer or a year's accounts in a bank
ledger-it is obvious that it would often be
practically out of the question to apply the
present principle by requiring the production of
the entire mass of documents and entries to be
perused by the jury or read alound to them.
The convenience of trials demands that other
evidence be allowed to be offered in the shape
of the testimony of a competent witness who
has perused the entire mass and will state summarily the net result. Such a practice is well
established to be proper."

As stated by counsel to the Court, these were records of a very small part of much larger and involved operation (T. 30, lines 10-14). See also State is.
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Olson, 75 Utah 583, 287 Pac. 181. See also Wigmore on
fridencc, Para. 1244.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE
QUALITY OF THE SAND AND AGGREGATE.

When the Appellant attempted to introduce evidence from two witnesses engaged in the concrete
business-Mr. Horsley (T. 37, lines 10-26) and Mr.
Fog le (T. 38, line 8 to T. 41, line 9)-the Court refused to admit testimony concerning standards of
quality or the meaning of the terms "sand or aggregate" within the industry. Appellant submits that
while a quality standard was not spelled out in the
agreement, it is implicit in the dealings of the parties
that the product would at least meet the definition
of the product within the industry in which it was
contemplated to be used. See Wigmore on Evidence,
3d Ed. Para. 2440.
Webster (7th New Collegiate Dictionary, page
762) decribes sand, inter alia, as
"l(a): a loose granular material resulting from
the disintegration of rocks that is used in
mortar, glass, abrasives and foundry molds;
(b): soil containing 85 % of more of sand and
a maximum of 10% of clay; (2(a): a tract of
sand; beach (b): a sand bank or sand box .... "
(Italics added)

Certainly the simple term "sand" has varied and
diverse meanings, both as a noun and as a verb.
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The "sand" subject of this litigation, was descriced
by Respondent's own witnesses who were admittedly not experts in this regard as "two stockpiles,
one unwashed sand, one washed sand" (Mr. Stromberg-T. 15, line 15) and by Mr. Rokich (T. 21, lines
11-17)
" . . . . part of that was sand that had been
washed but had become contaminated. And the
best description I can give you of the other was
kind of an aggregate, looked to me like a pea
gravel with a little dirt in it .
" (Italics
added)

On the other hand, when Mr. Horsley, an independent witness engaged in the concrete business, was asked a question concerning the quality
of a part of the sand in question, and whether it met
the standards of quality of his business, the Court
sustained Respondent's objections (T. 37, line:::; 3-26)
Mr. Fogle, who had been in the concrete business
for approximately 12 years, testified that the terms
"sand" or "aggregate" had a definite meaning as far
as a reference to standard, and that not all the materials in question met those standards (T. 39, lines 815). The Trial Court sustained objections to any further questioning on this line, apparently on the
basis that the agreement itself did not provide a
quality standard (T. 40, lines 24-25). Further Mr.
Fogle was precluded from testifying as to whether
all the usable aggregate or sand had been removed
on the grounds that the word "usable" called for a
conclusion (T. 41, lines 24-29). It is submitted that it
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was a conclusion concerning which the witness was
well qualified to testify. See Wigmore on Evidence 3d
Ed, para. 559; see also State vs. Lingman, 97 Utah 180,
91 Pac. 2d 457. It is submitted that the question of
whether the product in the stockpile was what is
known as "sand" or "aggregate" was a proper
question concerning which both Mr. Horsley and
Mr. Dan Fogle were competent to testify.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT APPELLANT IS INDEBTED TO THE RESPONDENT UNDER THE
AGREEMENT IN QUESTION.

(R.

By the terms of the agreement of the parties
4, also Exhibit A, R. 8)
"It is understood that the borrower is not personally liable for the payment of the $5,415.00
but that the Bank is relying upon the sale of
the sand and/or aggregate as a means of repaying the loan.

"In the event that the borrower does use
or remove the sand then he becomes personally
liable for the value of the sand used or removed from the stockpile at the rate of 50%¢
per ton."

Accordingly, if the Bank is to have a personal
judgment against Fogle, as was granted by the Trial
Court, there must be competent evidence to show
that Fogle did, in fact, "use or remove" sufficient
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sand, (or approximately 10,800 tons) to make him
personally liable to the Bank under the terms of the
agreement. The Court, in its Findings of Fact, made
no finding of the amount of sand or aggregate removed by Fogle. Rather, the Court makes a finding
that at the time Fogle took. possession there were two
stockpiles of certain dimensions. This, notwithstanding that the Bank's own witnesses described these
stockpiles variously as
" . . . . . and it went, that went upon a slope.
It went from maybe 4 to 20, 25 ft. That was on
a slope where it had been pushed up." (T. 15,
line 29 to T. 16, line 3)

And further
"I mean, I had no way of estimating the
height. Just estimating." (T. 16, lines 5-6)
". . . . . and that kind of went on a slope, or
pushed up, and it was irregular." (T. 21, lines
28-29)
" . . . . . but, I say, that was somewhat irregular." (T. 22, lines 1-2)
". . . .. just an estimate. As I say, it was an
estimate, and that's all." (T. 26, lines 23-24)

Mr. Rokich further testified concerning the sand (T.
26, line 25 to T. 27, line 11)
"Q
A

And your estimate of height was just from
looking at it?
Y ah, that's all.
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Q

The one pile of clean sand was of varying
depth?

A

Well, the-

Q

I mean, it wasn't a symmertical pile?

A

Well, it was kind of spilled out this way
(indicating). Ran, I think north and
south. Then the other one, I think, run on
in the other direction.

Q

But the depth varied from, in different
places?

A

Oh, yes. I don't think it was smooth, no.
It was not smooth.

Q

And you didn't determine the angle of the
sand, or the angle-

A

It was rounded. It was more of a rounded
type of mound. The washed sand, I think
what's up there now, pretty well represents the top of it."

Mr. Jensen testified (T. 12, lines 17-18)
". . . . the unwashed was on the bank, which
was hard to measure."

Based on this and the remaining testimony, it would
be pure conjecture to try to determine the amount
of material on the property when Fogle took possession,
if this were material under the agreement of the
parties. The agreement is not based upon what was
on the premises, but upon what amount Fogle used,
and the record is absolutely void of any evidence
whatever as to the amount of aggregate removed
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by Fogle, and the Court made no Finding of Fact
in this regard. The only evidence offered the Court
in this respect was that Mr. Jensen, which was refused admission by the Court per Point I. The Fact
that the Bank was able to recover only a part of
Barber's otherwise bad debt from Fogle should not
be the vehicle which entitles them to recover the
entire debt, and more.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Respondent has failed
in sustaining its burden of proof concerning the
amount of sand or aggregate removed by Fogle and
accordingly, the extent of his liability under the
agreement of the parties, and that the Complaint
should be dismissed, or in the alternative, the matter should be remanded with directions to admit the
competent evidence concerning these matters which
was denied admission by the Trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
Lee W. Hobbs

